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This paper explores residential and job location patterns and commuting behavior 
in a monocentric urban model with decentralized employment. We show that, in 
some cases, identical households choose different residential rings depending on 
their workers’ job locations. This means that high-income households whose workers 
work near the central business district (CBD) may choose residential locations near 
the CBD rather than in the suburbs if their workers have CBD job locations. In this 
case there will be a nonmonotonic relationship in the city between income level and 
residential distance from the CBD. Identical workers also are shown to choose 
different residential locations depending on their job locations. Wage gradients for 
workers as a function of job location are derived. The model also suggests that the 
skill composition of a firm’s workforce affects its incentive to move to the suburbs. 
Implications of the model for commuting patterns are explored. 0 1988 Academic 
Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we explore the determination of residential and job loca- 
tions and the pattern of commuting behavior in an urban model with 
decentralized employment. Various authors have explored models of cities 
with decentralized employment, but they have tended to make very special- 
ized assumptions concerning either the pattern of firm location or the 
nature of household behavior and have often been forced to use numerical 
simulation techniques to get results. In this paper we try to make very 
general assumptions concerning firm and household behavior. This ap- 
proach yields fewer definite answers, but it enables me to consider some 
new questions.’ 
*I am grateful to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and to the Urban Research Center, New 
York University, for research support. Roger Gordon, Sharon Megdal, David Pines, and an 
anonymous referee provided very helpful comments. 
‘Models of cities with decentralized employment include Moses [8], Muth [9l, Mills [7], 
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The most interesting result of the model is that, under some cir- 
cumstances, households having identical tastes, income, and number of 
workers occupy different rings around the city center depending on their 
job locations. This means that cities with decentralized employment may 
not have the usual residential location pattern in which successively more 
distant rings around the center are occupied by higher income households. 
Instead, in this model, households’ residential location choice depends on 
both their workers’ job locations and on their income levels. Thus a ring 
pattern is likely to emerge in which households whose income levels are 
high but whose job locations are near the center occupy residential rings 
that are close to the center. They may be surrounded by rings occupied by 
lower income households whose jobs are further out. Thus the nonmono- 
centric city has a nonmonotonic pattern of income level changes with 
greater distance from the center. This richer location pattern is more 
realistic than the simpler results of the traditional urban model. It provides, 
for example, a formal model of the “gentrified” location pattern observed 
in various cities in which high income households locate both near the 
center and in the far suburbs. 
The model also implies that otherwise identical workers have different 
job locations depending on their residential locations. In particular workers 
whose households have closer-in residential locations demand a smaller 
wage premium for extra commuting than do otherwise identical workers 
whose households live further out. The conditions under which workers 
who live further from the center hold more suburbanized jobs are devel- 
oped. The model also yields interesting insights concerning how workers’ 
wage offer curves for jobs at particular locations differ according to their 
skill or income levels. It suggests that the composition of a firm’s workforce, 
i.e., its relative mix of high-wage versus low-wage workers, is important in 
determining whether the firm will move out of the central business district 
(CBD) and, if so, how far. 
Finally, the model moves toward a more general theory of commuting 
behavior which synthesize two previously conflicting views of commuting: 
that emerging from urban economics, which argues that longer commut- 
ing journeys are compensated by lower housing prices, and that emerging 
from labor economics, which argues that longer commuting journeys are 
compensated by higher wages. * The results suggest that both wages and 
housing prices adjust to compensate for extra commuting in different 
circumstances, depending on the direction in which the commuting journey 
is changed and whether the household moves its job location, its housing 
location, or both. 
‘See Mills [7], Rees and Shultz [12], and Madden and White [6]. 
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Section 2 of the paper briefly reviews the theory of a city with centralized 
employment. Section 3 discusses the incentives facing 6rms making location 
choices within a metropolitan area and the commuting pattern that results 
for workers holding suburban jobs. Section 4 introduces decentralized 
employment into the residential location choice problem and explores its 
implications for the spatial variation of wages and land prices. Section 5 
explores the model’s implications for commuting behavior and considers 
avenues for further research. 
2. RESIDENTIAL LOCATION CHOICE IN CITIES WITH 
CENTRALIZED EMPLOYMENT 
We start by briefly reviewing the theory of a circular city when all 
employment is at the CBD. Assume that the city is located on a flat 
featureless plain and that the CBD is a point at its center. All households 
living in the city have one worker. They have identical utility functions 
which depend on consumption of land for housing, h, consumption of 
other goods, x, and leisure time of the worker, 1.3 All of these vary with 
residential distance from the center, denoted I(. Thus the utility function is 
Workers receive a fixed wage rate of w* per hour for working at the CBD 
at jobs whose hours are assumed to be continuously variable. Monetary 
commuting cost is m dollars per mile traveled in either direction and is 
constant at all locations. Commuting speed is l/s miles per hour and is 
also constant at all locations. Thus round trip monetary commuting costs 
are 2mu and round trip commuting time is 2s~. The rent per unit of land 
for housing at distance u is p(u). Households have a budget constraint and 
workers are assumed to have a time constraint. Total time available, 24 
hours per day, must be split among leisure, work, and commuting. Combin- 
ing the household’s time and money constraints results in the “full income” 
constraint, 
p(u)h(u) + x(u) + w*l(u) = 24w* - 2(sw* + m)u, (2) 
where 24w* - 2(sw* + m)u is full income or the amount that workers 
could earn net of time and money commuting expenses if they worked 24 
hours a day. 
Households maximize utility over h(u), x(u), and l(u), subject to the 
full income constraint. The full income constraint must hold at all loca- 
3The capital used in housing, i.e., the structure itself, is assumed to be part of the composite 
good. 
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tions. Therefore we can substitute (2) into (1) to get 
U[h(u),24w* - 2(sw* + m)u -p(u)h(u) - w*f(u),f(u)]. 
Totally differentiating the utility function using the envelope theorem, we 
can derive the condition on rent levels at dilIerent distances from the center 
such that a household achieves equal utility at all residential locations. We 
get the following well-known condition which is referred to as the house- 
hold’s rent offer curve for housing: 
P,(U) = 
-2(sw* + M) 
w ’ 
where the subscript indicates a partial derivative. 
Since work hours are flexible, the value of time at the margin must be w*. 
Thus the numerator of (3) is the total cost of commuting an extra mile 
round trip, including the monetary outlay and the value of time. Since the 
right-hand side of (3) is negative, the rent offer curve must always decline 
with distance from the city center. 
Differentiating (3) with respect to u and substituting (3) into the resulting 
expression, we get 
~Pu(U)/~U = h,(u) -- 
Pub) h(u) . 
The percentage change in the rate of decrease of the rent offer curve must 
equal minus the percentage change in housing consumption with increased 
residential suburbanization. Since consumption of land for housing rises in 
the suburbs where rents are lower, h u is positive. The left-hand side of (4) is 
therefore negative, so dp,,/Jau must be positive. The slope of the rent offer 
curve for housing thus gets flatter as u increases. 
Equation (3) describes a necessary condition on the rent offer curve such 
that households having the utility function and full income constraint in (1) 
and (2) achieve equal utility at all locations in a city having centralized 
employment. But if all households in the city have identical tastes and 
incomes and if all have one worker whose job is at the center, then the 
market equilibrium rent gradient must also satisfy (3) and (4). The market 
equilibrium rent gradient is denoted p”(u). 
Extending the model, suppose households stilI have identical tastes, but 
some workers are skilled and some are unskilled. SkilIed workers receive a 
wage rate of wb* per hour and unskilled workers receive a lower wage rate 
of wd* per hour. In this case we can derive separate conditions on the rent 
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offer curves for each of the two groups. The condition for skilled workers is 
P,“(U) = 
-2(sd* + 111) 
P(U) ’ 
where the superscripts b denote values of the variables for skilled workers’ 
households. The condition for unskilled workers (with superscripts d) is 
SilllilM. 
Both skilled and unskilled workers’ rent offer curves must decline at a 
decreasing rate with distance. Skilled workers’ households have higher 
demand for housing than unskilled workers’ households at any u, which 
tends to make their rent offer curves flatter. However skilled workers’ time 
is more valuable at the margin, which tends to make their rent offer curve 
steeper. In general the 6rst effect is usually assumed to be more important, 
making the rent offer curve flatter for skilled than unskilled workers. Given 
this assumption, the two rent offer curves are depicted in Fig. 1. Skilled 
workers’ households outbid unskilled workers’ households for land at 
suburban locations and unskilled workers’ households outbid skilled 
workers’ households at more central locations. Each group of households is 
now indiiTerent to locating over a range of distances from the center, rather 
than everywhere in the city. The market equilibrium rent gradient is the 
upper envelope of the two groups’ rent offer curves. It is shown as the 
dashed line in Fig. 1. 
With two income groups in the city, unskilled workers’ households thus 
occupy a region shaped like a thick ring around the CBD from distance 
u = 0 to U’ in all directions and skilled workers’ households occupy a 
0 U’ u* u 
FIG. 1. Rent offer curves of skilled and unskilled workers’ households and the market rent 
gradient. 
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surrounding thick ring from distances u = U’ to the outer edge of the city, 
u*. The boundary between the ring occupied by unskilled and skilled 
workers’ households occurs at some location u’. However we have not given 
the model enough structure to be able to determine the intercepts of the 
two functions or the distance U’ from the center at which they intersect.4 
3. FIRM LOCATION CHOICE 
In this section we examine the problem of firm location choice and the 
characteristics of labor markets in cities with decentralized employment. In 
particular we are interested in establishing conditions under which at least 
some firms in the city have an incentive to move out of the CBD. But we 
also rule out conditions in which so much firm suburbanization occurs that 
there is no commuting, because all workers work at home at very small 
firms. We use u to denote workplace location, where u is measured in miles 
from the CBD in any direction. 
The city is assumed to be located on a flat featureless plain, where land is 
not specialized for use in housing versus in production. Also there is no 
zoning or other land use regulation which might set particular regions of the 
city aside for particular land uses. Firms are assumed to occupy some but 
not all of the land in all rings around the CBD. Therefore the price that 
they pay for land in that ring is its value when used for housing, or p”(~).~ 
The assumption that some firms locate at all rings around the center is 
made for convenience, since it allows workplace location, u, to be treated as 
a continuous variable. But the general results of the model would not be 
changed if firms located in some, but not all, suburban rings. 
The wage which suburban firms must pay their workers depends on how 
much workers’ commuting journeys are shortened when the firm moves out 
of the CBD. Firms gain the most from suburbanizing if after the move their 
workers live both farther from the CBD than the firm itself and in the same 
direction away from the CBD (i.e., along the same ray from the CBD). We 
assume that all workers who take jobs at suburban firms satisfy both of 
these conditions. This could be because workers already live in the relevant 
region for their particular employer, because they move there when the firm 
does, or because the firm hires new workers who already live in the relevant 
region after it moves. The first of these two conditions eliminates the 
possibility of out-commuting by workers, i.e., it requires that workers live 
further from the CBD than their jobs. The second condition eliminates 
4See Mills [7] for a description of the extra equations needed to close a model similar to this 
one. 
‘The characteristics of households’ rent offer curves for land for housing and the market 
rent gradient are discussed under Section 2 for the centralized employment case and are 
discussed under Section 4 below for the decentralized employment case. 
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circumferential commuting. These assumptions are not as strong as they 
might appear. For workers to be willing to commute outward or cir- 
cumferentially to suburban jobs, employers must pay them more than if 
they commuted in an inward direction to the same jobs. Therefore it is in 
firms’ interest to locate in such a way that all their workers in-commute, i.e., 
so that all workers live further from the CBD than their employers and 
along the same ray from the CBD.6 
Assume that all workers have the same skill level and earn the same wage 
if they work at jobs in the CBD. The CBD wage is again denoted w*. Since 
workers taking suburban jobs have lower commuting costs than workers 
living at the same residential location who work at CBD jobs, employers at 
any u > 0 are assumed to pay their workers a lower wage than that 
prevailing at the center. The market wage gradient, denoted wm(u), there- 
fore must be negatively related to workplace location, u, or 6’ wm( u)/au < 0. 
In moving to suburban locations, firms are assumed to spread out in all 
directions around the CBD. This is because once some firms have located, 
say, exactly north of the CBD, their presence discourages additional firms 
from also locating exactly north of the CBD, since all firms located along a 
single ray from the CBD must compete for workers who live further out 
along the same ray. Other firms instead prefer to locate the same distance 
from the CBD, but one or more degrees away from north in either 
direction, where the potential labor supply willing to work for the firm at 
the wage w”(u) is likely to be larger. Thus there are agglomeration 
diseconomies as more firms locate along any particular ray from the CBD, 
regardless of how far away from the CBD they locate. If more jobs in total 
are offered by firms located along any particular ray than there are workers 
living along the same ray, then firms will only be able to attract enough 
workers if some workers out-commute or commute circumferentially. But 
this requires that firms pay higher wages than would be necessary if they 
spread out in different directions, so that all workers could in-commute. 
These assumptions imply that no suburban subcenters will form which 
contain enough firms that they exhaust the labor supply composed of 
workers who commute inward to the firms they work for. 
It is interesting to note that firms which suburbanize drastically restrict 
the labor market area from which they hire workers. While firms located at 
he these assumptions realistic? In a recent study, Simpson [13] finds that 70% of a sample 
of households living in London who were not recent movers had jobs closer to the center than 
their homes and had job locations that were in the same direction away from the center as 
their residential locations. The criterion used to determine whether households’ job and 
residential locations were in the same direction away from the center was that they both be in 
a pie-shaped wedge having its center at the city center and an angle of 0.2% radians or 
one-eight of a circle. gee Hamilton [4] and White [18] for further discussion concerning the 
commuting pattern in U.S. cities. 
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the CBD can hire workers who live in any direction from the CBD; firms 
located, say, north of the CBD can only hire workers who live both north of 
the CBD and further out than the firm. As a result, moving out of the CBD 
will tend to be most attractive to firms that are relatively small. 
For our purposes, it is not necessary to present a formal model of firms’ 
location decision. Such a model would have firms gain from suburbanizing 
because they pay lower land prices and lower wages in the suburbs, but 
their goods transport costs or their costs of production could be higher. 
Firms would maximize profit over their choice of location, where each 
location is a ring around the CBD. In such a model, it is reasonable to 
assume that one suburban ring (or a few) would be the profit-maximizing 
location for any particular firm. This implies that identical firms would 
concentrate in one or a few suburban rings, rather than distributing 
themselves over all suburban rings. However if there were firms in many 
industries located in the city, then firms in each industry would locate in the 
profit-maximizing ring for that industry, but nonetheless there would be 
firms of some type located in many or all suburban rings. Note that 
agglomeration diseconomies also result if many firms attempt to locate in 
the same ring. In this case firms would bid up the price of land in that ring, 
giving themselves an incentive to choose locations in adjacent rings which 
are slightly closer-in or further-out. These adjacent rings have lower de- 
mand and therefore lower prices. If firms instead scatter over many rings, 
then they will pay for land according to the market rent gradient estab- 
lished for land used for housing.7 
4. RESIDENTIAL AND JOB LOCATION CHOICE IN 
CITIES WITH DECENTRALIZED EMPLOYMENT 
We now generalize the model of household residential and job location 
choice to allow for decentralized employment. This will enable us to 
investigate the characteristics of equilibrium market rent and wage gradi- 
ents in the decentralized city case. 
‘Other patterns of employment decentralization are also possible, but they may give rise to 
different spatial wage and price gradients than those considered here. For example, White [15] 
analyxed a model of a city in which employment was located both at the CBD and at a 
suburban subcenter at an arbitrarily chosen distance ring. In that model, the concentration of 
jobs at the subcenter results in a labor shortage, causing wages there to rise in order to attract 
additional workers who live closer to the CBD than the subcenter and therefore must 
out-commute. The resulting land price gradient is double-peaked, having a second local 
maximum at the suburban subcenter. This type of model, in which employment decentralixa- 
tion is profitable even when labor shortages in the suburbs require that wages be raised to 
attract out-commuters, is only reasonable if agglomeration economies or some important cost 
savings result from locating at the subcenter. In the ring subcenter model, the cost savings 
result from the existence of a circumferential highway at the subcenter location. 
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Households again have a single worker and all workers are assumed to 
have the same skill level. With decentralized employment, households’ 
demand for goods and leisure depend on both residential and job locations, 
u and u. Their utility function therefore becomes U = U(h(u, u), X(U, u), 
eu, UN. 
In the decentralized employment case, there will be a market rent 
gradient, p”(u), which depends only on residential distance from the 
center, U. In other words, the rent on land at any u paid by households that 
live at that u will not depend on the job locations of the households’ 
workers. However we wish to consider the possibility that households 
whose workers have different job locations may be willing to pay different 
amounts for land at the same location. Therefore households’ rent offer 
curves, denoted p( u, u), may depend on both residential and workplace 
location. If households’ rent offer curves do vary with job location, then 
p”(u) will be the upper envelope of the set of rent offer curves of groups of 
households having different job locations. 
Similarly, there will be a market wage gradient, V(u), which depends 
only on workplace distance from the center. In other words, employers 
located u miles from the center will pay the same wage to all workers 
regardless of their residential locations. However we wish to consider the 
possibility that workers whose residential locations differ may be willing to 
work at a particular job location for different wage levels. Thus workers’ 
wage offer curves, denoted w(u, u), may depend on both workplace and 
residential location. If workers’ wage offer curves do vary with residential 
location, then w”(u) will be the lower envelope of the set of wage offer 
curves of groups of workers whose households have different residential 
locations. 
Households’ full income constraint therefore becomes 
p(u, Mu, 0) + x(u, 0) + wtu, MU, 4 
= 24w(u, u) - 2(sw(u, u) + m)(u - u), (6) 
where p(u, u) and w(u, u) are now the rent offer and wage offer curves for 
the household and its worker. Since all workers in-commute, one-way 
commuting distance is (u - u). Full income, 24w( II, u) - 2(sw(u, u) + 
m)(u - u), is denoted F( u, u). 
Households maximiz e utility subject to the full income constraint over 
their choice of consumption levels of h(u, u), x(u, u), and Z(u, u) and over 
their residential and job locations, u and u. The full income constraint must 
be satisfied at all residential and workplace locations. Substituting the full 
income equation into the utility function, we get 
U[h,24w(u,u) - 2(sw(u,u) + m)(u-u) -p(u,u)h- w(u,u)Z,Z]. 
(7) 
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Households must achieve the same utility level at all workplace/residential 
location pairs that they choose to occupy. Totally differentiating (7) with 
respect to u and u and using the envelope theorem, we get 
24w, - 2sw,( u - u) - 2(sw + m) - p,h - w,,I = 0 (8) 
and 
24~” - 2sw,(u - u) + 2(sw + M) - p,h - w”I = 0. (9) 
These equations respectively characterize households’ rent and wage offer 
curves in the decentralized city case.8 
Focusing first on (8), we find that it contains terms in wU. However 
suppose the household lives at an arbitrary residential location, u’. Also 
suppose that its worker works at some job location u’, where u’ I u’. For 
the worker to work at u’, it must be the case that his/her wage offer at u’ 
must be less than or equal to the wage offer at u’ of workers living either 
closer in or further out than u’. Therefore wU(u’, u’) must equal zero. (If 
instead all workers have the same wage offer curves regardless of residential 
location, then wJu’, u’) still must equal zero.) Therefore solving for the 
household’s rent offer curve, we get 
Pub 4 = 
-2(sw(u) + 111) 
h(w) ’ (10) 
Turn now to (9). It contains terms in p,. But suppose a worker works at 
an arbitrary job location u” and lives at an arbitrary residential location u”, 
where u” 2 u”. For the worker’s household to live at u”, its rent offer at u” 
must be greater than or equal to the rent offer at u” of households whose 
workers work either closer in or further out than u”. Therefore p,( u”, u”) 
must equal zero. Then solving for the worker’s wage offer curve, we get 
-2(sw(u) + m) 
wh’) = 24 - 2s(u - u) - l(u, u) * (11) 
In the subsection below we discuss rent offer curves and market rent 
gradients further. The following subsection considers wage offer curves and 
market wage gradients. A third subsection then reintroduces the possibility 
of workers having multiple skill levels. 
‘The rent and wage offer curves can also be derived straightforwardly from households’ 
indirect utility function, making use of Roy’s Identity. 
DECENTRALJZED CITIES 139 
4.1. Rent Gradients in Decentralized Cities 
How do the characteristics of households’ rent offer curves compare in 
the centralized versus the decentralized employment cases? Examining (3) 
and (lo), we find that rent offer curves in the two cases have the same form, 
except that the wage rate varies with job location in the latter. Rent offer 
curves therefore must always have negative slopes, regardless of whether 
employment is centralized or decentralized. 
But do rent offer curves also decline with distance at a decreasing rate in 
the decentralized employment case? To investigate this question, we differ- 
entiate (10) with respect to u, assuming an arbitrary Gxcd job location, u. 
(This procedure is followed since the rent offer curve for a household gives 
its level of willingness to pay for land for housing at different residential 
locations, given any fixed job location. Not all residential locations will turn 
out to be feasible for a household having any particular job location, since 
it may be outbid by other households for land at some locations, but its 
offer level can be determined nonetheless.) The result is: 
Examining (12), since h .( u, u) must be positive when u remains unchanged, 
itJp,,/a u must be positive. Therefore rent offer curves decline at a decreasing 
rate with distance from the center of the city-the same result as in the 
centralized city case examined above. 
We now turn to the question of whether, in a city with decentralized 
employment, workers’ job locations afI’cct households’ rent offer curves for 
land at particular residential locations. In other words, we establish whether 
or not otherwise identical households whose workers work at different job 
locations are willing to pay the same amount for land at particular 
residential locations. If so, then households having different workplace 
locations will mix together over at least some set of residential locations, as 
long as all households live further out than their workers’ jobs. If not, then 
households that differ only by workplace location will segregate into 
different residential rings. 
Examining (10) above, we note that households’ rent offer curves depend 
on workplace location, u, as well as on residential location, u. To determine 
how a household’s rent offer curve depends on its worker’s job location, we 
differentiate (10) with respect to u, holding u constant. This allows us to 
determine how a household’s willingness-to-pay schedule for land for 
housing at all residential locations (including locations at which it will be 
outbid) varies when its worker’s job location changes. The result is: 
aPu 1 
au - 5;[ -2sw, - p,h,]. 
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0 v’ u’ u* u 
FIG. 2. Rent offer curves of households whose workers work at the CBD and at a suburban 
job location when only in-commuting occurs. 
Equation (13) is difficult to sign with confidence. The first term in square 
brackets is clearly negative. The second term involves h,, the variation in 
housing demand as the household’s workplace location becomes more 
suburbanized. If h, is positive or zero, then the second term in (13) is also 
positive or zero and the sign of ap,JJu will be positive. If h, is negative, 
then the sign of ap,JJau can be positive, zero, or negative depending on the 
size of h,. In fact, it seems most likely that the sign of h, is positive or zero, 
since h, is the change in housing consumption when workplace location 
becomes more suburbanized but residential location remains fixed. This 
means that workers’ commuting journey is reduced in both time and money 
cost and their wage rate is reduced, but not by enough to make full income 
fall. In this case it seems unlikely that housing consumption would fall and 
in general the effects on housing consumption of a change in u would seem 
likely to be small. However, since we are unable to sign ap,,/Jau with 
confidence, we consider all three possibilities separately below. 
Case 1. Assume that i?pJau is positive. This means that households’ 
rent offer curves become flatter as workers’ job locations become more 
suburbanized. This situation is depicted in Fig. 2 for a case in which 
residential locations vary continuously, but there are assumed to be only 
two job locations: at the CBD, where u = 0, and at some u = u’ > 0. The 
steeper rent offer curve, labeled pi(u), is that of households whose workers 
work at the CBD, while the flatter rent offer curve, labeled pz( u), is that of 
households whose workers work at u’. Note that only households whose 
‘Actually, suburban workers’ households are willing to bid for land closer-in than u’. But 
from these locations they would have to out-commute to work, causing their rent offer curves 
to decline as they located further from v’ in the direction approaching the CBD. 
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workers work at the CBD bid for land between u = 0 and u = v’.~ Between 
u = v’ and u’, both groups of households bid for land, but households 
whose workers work at the CBD outbid suburban workers’ households. 
Beyond u’, both groups again bid for land, but households whose workers 
work at the suburban job location, v’, are willing to bid more. The 
residential boundary between the two groups of households, u’, must be at 
least as far out as the suburban employment location, or u’ 2 v’. Its precise 
location depends on the relative number of workers employed at the CBD 
versus at the suburban employment ring. The market rent gradient, p”(u), 
is the upper envelope of the two groups’ rent offer curves. It is shown as the 
dashed line in Fig. 2. 
This result is striking because it indicates that households may segregate 
into different residential rings even when they have identical utility func- 
tions, the same number of workers per household, and identical earning 
abilities. Previous urban models have only resulted in residential segrega- 
tion when either household tastes, household incomes, or both are assumed 
to differ. In this model, workers are indifferent over a range of residential 
locations and commuting journey lengths, given their job locations. Workers 
who work at v’ will be inditTerent among residential locations between u’ 
and I(*, the outer edge of the city. They will therefore be indifferent among 
commuting journey lengths ranging from a minimum of (u’ - v’) miles to a 
maximum of (u* - v’) miles. Workers who work at v = 0 will be indiffer- 
ent among residential locations between u = 0 and u’ and among commut- 
ing journey lengths ranging from zero to u’ miles. However all households 
in the model achieve equal utility and are indifferent across all job loca- 
tion/residential location pairs in the ranges just enumerated. 
Case 2. Now suppose apJav = 0. In this case, households’ rent offer 
curves for land are unaffected by their workers’ job locations, as long as 
only in-commuting occurs. Then all households’ rent offer curves are the 
same, regardless of their workers’ job locations. In the context of Fig. 2, the 
two rent offer curves would be identical. This case leads to the maximum 
amount of residential mixing possible in a model having decentralized 
employment. Here, residential locations between the CBD and v’ would 
still be occupied exclusively by households having CBD workers, but 
residential locations between v’ and the outer edge of the city would be 
occupied by a mix of households whose workers work at the CBD and at 
the suburban job location. 
In this special case, the commuting pattern in the decentralized city has a 
simple property: workers are indiflerent over all commuting journey lengths 
as long as they in-commute. Increases in the commuting journey length due 
to a household moving its residential location further out are compensated 
by lower land prices (and vice versa); while increases in the commuting 
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journey length due to a worker moving his/her job location further in are 
compensated by higher wages (and vice versa). As long as all households 
have identical tastes and incomes, workers are indifferent over a wide range 
of commuting journey lengths, from 0 miles to U* miles. In this case, 
workers or households would only have preferences for particular commut- 
ing journey lengths if they had tastes or income levels which differed from 
the tastes or income levels of households generally, such as having two 
workers when other households in the city have only one worker.” 
Case 3. Finally, suppose ap,,/Jau is negative. In this case, rent offer 
curves by households become steeper as their workers’ job locations become 
more suburbanized. Suppose again that there are only two job locations, at 
u = 0 and u’. Then the two groups’ rent offer curves are shown in Fig. 3. 
Suburban workers’ rent offer curve is now the steeper curve labeled pi(u), 
while CBD workers’ rent offer curve is now the flatter curve labeled p*(u). 
Suburban workers’ households outbid CBD workers’ households for hous- 
ing at the closer-in region between u = 0 and u’, while CBD workers’ 
households outbid suburban workers’ households for housing in the further- 
out region beyond u’. The market rent gradient is again shown as a dashed 
line. 
In this case suburban workers living between u = 0 and u = u’ must 
out-commute to their jobs. But if out-commuting occurs, then the situation 
depicted in Fig. 3 cannot be an equilibrium. To see this, compare the 
situations of two households whose workers both work at u’, but who live at 
u = u’ + 1 and u = u’ - 1. Both workers earn the same wage rate and both 
have the same length commuting journey. Households’ indirect utility 
function is I/ = V( p”( u), w”‘(u), 24w”( u) - 2(sw “( u) + m)( u - u)). For 
the two households, their wage rate and full income levels are the same, but 
their rent levels are different. Therefore their utility levels, which are 
I’( p”( u’ + l), wm(u’), 24w”( u’) - 2(swm( u’) + WI)) for the household liv- 
ing at u = u’ + 1 and V(p”( u’ - l), w  “( u’), 24w “( u’) - 2(sw”( u’) + m)) 
for the household living at u = u’ - 1, cannot be the same. In order for the 
household living at u’ - 1 to achieve the same utility level as the household 
living at u’ + 1, the rent offer curve pi(u) and the market rent gradient 
would have to decrease rather than increase for residential locations closer-in 
than u’. (This is shown as the dotted line in Fig. 3.) Thus Case 3 cannot be 
an equilibrium if only in-commuting is assumed to occur in the model.” 
“See White [17] for discussion and estimation of a model of commuting behavior in this 
case. If there are multiple income/skill levels, then the indifference property discussed above 
holds within the residential ring chosen by households of that income/skill level. 
“Note that if out-commuting occurred, there could be a second region just outside the CBD 
occupied by households whose workers have CBD jobs. 
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FIG. 3. Rent offer curves of households whose workers work at the CBD and at a suburban 
job location when some out-commuting occurs. 
To summarixe the results of this subsection, we have shown that in an 
urban model with decentralized job locations, households having identical 
tastes whose workers have identical skill levels may nonetheless have 
different rent offer curves for land at the same residential locations. This 
implies that households whose workers have d&rent job locations may 
segregate into different residential rings. The most likely pattern (but not 
the only one possible) appears to be that households locate in concentric 
residential rings in order of the centrality of their workers’ job locations. 
This means that in equilibrium, households’ residential and job locations 
will be nonnegatively related to each other. 
4.2. Wage Gradients in Decentralized Cities 
Turn now to the wage gradient. We wish to explore the properties of 
wage gradients and also to consider whether otherwise identical workers 
having different residential locations are willing to work for different wage 
rates at the same workplace location. 
We derived an expression for workers’ wage offer curves in (11) above. 
Examining (ll), the numerator is the cost of commuting per mile round trip 
and the denominator is number of hours of work. With decentralized 
employment, the wage rate falls with increases in employment suburbaniza- 
tion by the reduction in per mile commuting cost per hour of work. The 
wage gradient must always be negative. 
Using the wage and rent offer curves, (8) and (9), we can determine in a 
relative sense how quickly they each decline with distance from the CBD. 
Substituting (8) into (9) we get 
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where n(u, u) = 24 - 2s(u - u) - I(u, u) is hours of work. The percentage 
rate of decrease of the wage offer curve per extra mile of workplace distance 
from the CBD equals the percentage rate of decrease of the rent offer curve 
per extra mile of residential distance from the CBD times the ratio of 
expenditure on residential land to earnings from labor. The ratio of land 
expenditure to earnings depends on the location variables; however, it must 
be less than the ratio of housing expenditure to earnings. The latter has 
been well studied and is usually thought to be around 2Y~6.~’ Thus the wage 
offer curve should be expected to decline at a much lower proportionate 
rate with distance from the center than the rent offer curve. 
How does the rate of decline of workers’ wage offer curves vary as job 
suburbanization increases, holding residential location constant? To answer 
this, we differentiate the wage offer curve, (ll), with respect to U, assuming 
an arbitrary fixed residential location, U. This results in 
The expression in parentheses in the numerator of (15) is the reduction in 
commuting time per extra mile of job suburbanization when residential 
location is fixed, minus the change in work time per extra mile of job 
suburbanization. In general we expect that as employment becomes more 
suburbanized, workers will split the savings in commuting time in some 
proportion between extra leisure and extra work. If so then n, is positive, 
(- 2s - n,) is negative, and the sign of 8 WV/au must be positive. 
Thus workers’ wage offer curves must fall at a decreasing rate with 
greater workplace suburbanization. As long as there is diminishing marginal 
utility of both leisure and goods, the marginal value of leisure time and 
work time must increase as the commuting journey gets longer and less time 
is available for both work and leisure. Leisure time is valued directly and 
work time is valued because it leads to more income and therefore more 
nonleisure goods. In order to induce workers to commute farther toward 
the CBD from fixed residential locations and therefore to give up more 
leisure and/or work time, the wage gradient must allow for the fact that the 
value of time at the margin is increasing. The wage gradient thus must 
increase at an increasing rate as u falls, i.e., as the CBD is approached. 
It is interesting to note that a negative linear wage gradient is highly 
unlikely to occur in the context of the model. Suppose we make the strong 
simplifying assumption that work hours are fixed at n*. In this case, the 
slope of the wage gradient becomes w,(u) = - Z(W(U) + m)/n*, and 
aw,/au = -2sw,/n* > 0. Thus the wage gradient must still decline at a 
‘2This relationship was pointed out by Muth [9]. 
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decreasing rate with greater workplace distance from the CBD. As long as 
leisure time enters the utility function, the resulting wage gradient cannot 
decrease at a constant rate with workplace distance.‘3 
Now consider whether otherwise identical workers whose residential 
locations differ have different wage offer curves. Examining (ll), the wage 
offer curve clearly depends on residential location, u, as well as on 
workplace location, u. To determine how workers’ wage offers at different 
job locations vary as residential location changes, we differentiate (11) 
partially with respect to U, holding u constant. This results in 
nu aw” 
au - -wG-a 
Since wv is negative, the sign of (16) depends on that of n,, the change in 
work hours when residential location becomes more suburbanized, holding 
job location constant. When residential distance from the center increases, 
commuting journey length increases, leaving less time available for work 
and leisure together. It seems likely that workers in this situation would 
share the time loss between reduced hours of work and reduced leisure in 
some proportion. If so, then n, must be negative, which implies that 
aw,/a u must be negative. In that case, workers living at more distant 
residential locations must have steeper wage offer curves. However since 
this argument is informal, we consider all three possible signs of 8 w,/a u 
briefly below. 
Case 1. Continuing with the assumption that 8 w,/a u is negative, 
suppose there are only two residential locations, at u* and a**, where 
u** > u*, but workplace locations vary continuously. Workers living at u** 
must have steeper wage offer curves than workers living at u*. The two 
groups’ wage offer curves are shown in Fig. 4, where the steeper curve 
labeled wr( u) is the wage offer curve of workers living at u** and the flatter 
curve labeled wz(u) is the wage offer curve of workers living at u*. Since 
the market wage gradient is the lower envelope of the wage offer curves, it is 
shown as the dashed line in Fig. 4. (Note that if only in-commuting occurs, 
the wage offer curve of workers living at u* must end at u = u*.) The result 
in this case is that workers living at the closer residential location get jobs at 
the closer-in range of workplace locations, from u = 0 to u’, while workers 
living at the more distant residential location get jobs at the more distant 
range of workplace locations, from u = u’ to u = u**. In this case, all 
workers in-commute to their jobs. 
13Many researchers have assumed or derived linear wage gradients in models of decentral- 
ized cities, usually in models in which leisure time does not enter households’ utility functions. 
See White [15] and Ogawa and Fujita [lo]. 
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0 v’ u* u** v 
FIG. 4. Wage offer curves of workers whose households live at two different residential 
locations. 
Note that under these assumptions, the market wage gradient, wm(u), 
can have any shape as long as its slope is negative. As drawn in Fig. 4, it is 
approximately negative linear. But depending on the number of wage offer 
curves and how strongly they vary with residential location, the market 
wage gradient could be observed to decline at an increasing or decreasing 
rate with increases in U. This differs from the result for the rent functions, 
where the market rent gradient declined at a decreasing rate with distance, 
the same shape as individual households’ rent offer curves. 
In this case, workers again are indifIerent over a range of commuting 
journey lengths. Workers living at u* are indifferent over job locations 
between u = 0 and u’, and over commuting journey lengths ranging from a 
minimum of U* - U’ miles to a maximum of u* miles. Workers living at 
u** are indifferent over job locations between u = u’ and u = a**, and over 
commuting journey lengths ranging from 0 miles to I(** - u’ miles. 
Case 2. Now suppose aw,/J u = 0. In this case the two wage offer 
curves in Fig. 4 would be identical and the market wage gradient, w”‘(u), 
would be identical to the wage offer curves. Workers living at both 
residential locations would be willing to work at any job location for the 
same wage, as long as they in-commuted to their jobs. 
In this case, workers are indifferent over a wider range of commuting 
journey lengths. For example, if there were again only two residential 
locations at U* and u**, then workers living at U* would be inditferent over 
job locations between u = 0 and u = I(* and over commuting journey 
lengths ranging from 0 miles to a* miles. Workers living at u** would be 
indiEerent over job locations between u = 0 and u = u** and over com- 
muting journey lengths ranging from 0 miles to u** miles. 
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Case 3. Finally suppose that aw,/a u < 0. Then the two wage offer 
curves shown in Fig. 4 would be reversed. The steeper curve, wi( D), would 
be the wage offer curve of workers living at u* and the flatter curve would 
be the wage offer curve of workers living at u**. In this case workers living 
at the more distant residential location would underbid others for the 
closer-in jobs and workers living closer-in would underbid others for the 
more distant jobs. In particular, workers living at u* would both in-com- 
mute and out-commute to jobs located between IJ = u’ and u = u**. 
To show that this outcome cannot occur, examine the situation of two 
workers whose households both live at u*. One worker works at u = U* - 1 
and thus in-commutes and the other worker works at u = U* + 1 and thus 
out-commutes. The wage offer curve of workers living at u* is wi(u). Note 
that wi( u) equals the market wage gradient, wm( u), from u = u’ to the 
outer edge of the city. The worker who works at u = u* - 1 has a wage rate 
of wi(U* - 1) = Wrn(U * - 1) and the worker who works at u = U* + 1 has 
a wage rate of wi(u* + 1) = wm(u* + l), where wm(a* - 1) > wm(u* + 
1). But the two workers’ households cannot achieve equal utility. To see 
this, note that the indirect utility function for both is V = 
V( p”(u), w”(u), F(u, u)), where full income, F(u, u), equals 24wm( u) 
minus total per mile commuting cost times commuting distance. For the 
two workers living at u*, rent is the same, and commuting distance is the 
same. This means that the only factors entering the indirect utility function 
which differ are the wage rate and full income. The worker who in-com- 
mutes has both a higher wage rate and a higher full income level than the 
worker who out-commutes. Therefore the worker who in-commutes must be 
better off than the worker who out-commutes and the situation represented 
in Case 3 cannot be an equilibrium. In order for out-commuting to occur, 
the market wage gradient must begin to rise rather than fall for job 
locations further out than u = u*. 
We have shown that in a city with decentralized employment in which all 
workers in-commute to their jobs, workers living at different residential 
locations will tend to prefer different job locations. It is interesting to note 
that the wage offer curves and market wage gradients discussed here in 
Cases 1 and 2 constitute the maximum possible wage reductions that firms 
can achieve by moving to suburban locations. With these wage gradients, 
firms have appropriated all of the gain to workers from shorter commuting 
journeys when job locations become suburbanized. 
4.3. Wage and Rent Gradients When There Are Multiple Skill Levels 
Suppose now that we reintroduce the possibility that workers have 
different skill levels and different wage rates. We wish to investigate how 
rent and wage offer curves and the location pattern vary with workers’ 
wage/skill level in cities with decentralized employment. 
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FIG. 5. Possible residential location pattern in a city with two skill classes and two job 
locations. 
Assume that there are two skill groups, skilled workers and unskilled 
workers. Assume also that there are two employment locations, at u = 0 
and u’. Then using the results developed under Sections 2 and 4.1, one 
outcome is that there will be four separate residential rings, one for each 
skill class and workplace location. Such a situation is shown in Fig. 5. 
There, unskilled workers with CBD jobs have the steepest rent offer curve. 
They occupy the innermost residential ring. They are surrounded by a ring 
of skilled CBD workers, whose rent offer curve declines more steeply. The 
third ring is occupied by unskilled suburban workers. The suburban em- 
ployers must be located in a ring somewhere between the CBD and the 
residential boundary between the second and third rings. The outermost 
ring is occupied by skilled workers whose jobs are at the same suburban 
employment ring. The market land price gradient is the upper envelope. 
The important result here is that income/skill levels do not increase 
monotonically with residential distance from the CBD, as is usually the 
result in urban models with centralized employment. 
Now turn to workers’ wage offer curves. We can investigate how they 
vary with skill level by differentiating (12) with respect to w(u), holding 
everything else constant. We get 
aw (4 A = 3-2s - ?z,W”]. 
aww 
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The first term in (17) is the effect on the wage offer curve of the increase in 
the value of time spent commuting, which is negative. As higher wages 
make time more valuable, the wage offer curve gets steeper. The second 
term is the effect on the wage offer curve of the change in time spent 
working. It is positive if nw is positive, i.e., if time spent working increases 
when the wage rate rises. (Ibis requires that the positive substitution effect 
on work time outweigh the negative income effect when the wage rate rises.) 
If so then the effect of the second term in (17) is also to make the wage offer 
curve steeper as the wage rate rises. l4 Returning to (17), while the sign of 
w,/w is ambiguous, we assume here that it is negative because the commut- 
ing cost effect is more important than the labor supply effect. If so, then 
workers’ wage offer curves become steeper as their skill levels rise. In this 
case, the model predicts that lirms have stronger incentives to suburbanize 
as the average skill level and wage rate of their workers rise. This is because 
the wage offer curves of highly skilled workers fall more steeply with greater 
workplace distance from the CBD. In contrast, employers of low-skill 
workers have much less incentive to suburbanize because low-skilled 
workers’ flatter wage offer curves cause the cost reduction from suburban- 
ization to be smaller. Furthermore, since low-skill workers tend to choose 
residential locations close to the CBD and there is no out-commuting in the 
model, employers cannot move very far from the CBD without severely 
restricting their potential labor supply. This also will tend to keep them 
close to the CBD. 
These results seem realistic in a general way, since we often observe that 
firms whose workforce contains a high proportion of very skilled workers 
choose to locate in the suburbs. Research and development branches of 
large corporations are an example. In contrast, firms that employ a mixture 
of highly skilled and less skilled workers seem more likely to locate in the 
CBD. Banks and brokerage firms are examples of the latter. 
We can illustrate the variation in the wage offer curves with skill level. 
Assume that there are two skill groups in the city and that all skilled 
workers live in more distant residential rings than unskilled workers. The 
residential boundary between the two groups is at u’. Firms are assumed to 
be at scattered locations. Also each firm is assumed to hire only one type of 
worker, not both. Figure 6 shows separate wage offer curves for skilled and 
unskilled workers. Unskilled workers’ wage offer curve is flatter and ends at 
u’, since no firm employing unskilled workers will locate further out than 
141t is interesting to note that the two terms in (16) have a similar interpretation to the two 
terms which result when the rent offer curve changes in response to a change in the wage rate, 
as discussed under Section 2. The two terms there consist of a value of commuting time effect, 
which is negative, and a change in housing demand effect, which is positive. The latter is 
usually assumed to outweigh the former, causing higher wage households to have flatter rent 
offer curves than lower wage households. 
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FIG. 6. Wage offer curves of skilled and unskilled workers. 
these workers live. Firms employing skilled workers can locate anywhere in 
the city. Thus firms employing either type of worker may mix together in 
the thick ring from u = 0 to u’, while only firms employing skilled workers 
will locate in the surrounding thick ring from u = u’ to the outer edge of 
the city. Note that firms are not bidding against each other for sites here, 
nor are workers of each skill type bidding against each other for jobs. We 
cannot predict from the wage offer curves that either type of firm outbids 
the other for sites at any particular location. To answer this question, we 
would need to determine how much firms of each type could pay for land at 
any u assuming that the relevant profit conditions were met. The rent offer 
curve for firms has no necessary relation to their wage gradient. 
5. COMMUTING BEHAVIOR AND THE 
INDIFFERENCE PROPERTY 
In a city with multiple skill levels but only CBD employment (shown in 
Fig. 2) workers of any income level are indifferent over a range of 
commuting journey lengths. The range of commuting journey lengths 
covered by the indifference property extends from journeys between the 
CBD and the innermost location in the thick residential ring occupied by 
that income group to journeys between the CBD and the outermost 
location in the same residential ring. Workers are indifferent over this range 
of commuting journey lengths because a longer commute is compensated by 
lower housing prices at more distant residential locations. 
This research was started with the intent of exploring whether an 
analogous iudiBerence property exists over commuting journeys of varying 
lengths in a decentralized city. In fact it seemed that the indifFerence 
property applying in decentralized cities would be far more general. With 
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suburban as well as CBD job locations as possibilities, workers living in any 
residential ring could potentially be indifferent over commuting journey 
lengths ranging from working at home (a zero length commute) to working 
at the CBD to working anywhere in between. Extensions of the commuting 
journey caused by-changes in workplace location would be compensated by 
changes in the wage rate, while extensions of the commuting journey caused 
by changes in residential location would be compensated by lower housing 
prices. Preferences for particular commuting journey lengths would exist 
only for households with atypical tastes, such as those having two workers 
in a city where households generally have only one worker. 
In fact, this paper has shown that in cities with decentralized employ- 
ment, a broad commuting indifference property holds only in the special 
case described under Subsections 4.1 and 4.2, Case 2. In general, we showed 
that households’ rent offer curves for land for housing depend on their 
workers’ job locations. We also showed that workers’ wage offer curves for 
different job locations vary depending on their households’ residential 
locations. These properties lead to a residential pattern in which households 
segregate themselves into rings depending on their workers’ job locations 
and to a job location pattern in which workers living in particular resi- 
dential rings have preferences over where they work. Thus the indifference 
property in an urban model with decentralized employment model is 
narrower rather than broader than that prevailing in a model with central- 
ized employment. The only inditTerence property applying over commuting 
journeys in the decentralized employment case is that workers will be 
indifferent over all journey lengths between their preferred residential rings 
and the ring of workplace locations associated with that residential loca- 
tion. If the relevant rings are thin, then the indifference property will apply 
only over a narrow range of commuting journey lengths. Thus there is no 
generalized indifference property applying to commuting journey lengths in 
cities with decentralized employment.” 
It is difficult to determine from a theoretical model how important this 
segmentation effect is. In practice, households may be almost indifferent 
over residential rings regardless of their workplace location, or the incentive 
to choose different residential rings depending on job location may be 
strong. A clear next step in this type of research would be a simulation 
model which could investigate this question. But although the model did 
not do very well in terms of providing a strong indifference property, it does 
provide a rich set of possible outcomes concerning patterns of residential 
location by households of different income levels, enabling researchers to 
explore more complex urban location patterns. It also suggests that if good 
“See Simpson [13], White 1161, and Madden [5] for other approaches to explaining 
commuting behavior in decentralized cities. 
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research on commuting patterns is to proceed, we need better data concem- 
ing both residential and job location within metropolitan areas, in addition 
to the obvious need for data on actual commuting journey length. 
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